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Testing for redlining in the labor market
 
 
Yannick L’HORTY, Mathieu BUNEL, Pascale PETIT1 
 
 
Summary2 
 
When an employer refuses to recruit a job applicant due to the applicant’s place of residence, 
we speak of redlining in the labor market. There are two justifications for the practice on the 
part of the employer. The first is associated with the excessive distance between the 
applicant’s place of residence and the workplace, based on spatial mismatch logic. The second 
is linked to the neighborhood's characteristics based on signal logic. We propose to 
distinguish between these two mechanisms using a correspondence test conducted in the Paris 
region for two occupations, servers and cooks. It appears that the distance effect plays a 
significant role and reinforces the effect of the neighborhood’s reputation. The most 
disadvantaged neighborhoods combine these two types of drawbacks.  
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1. Introduction 
Redlining3 is a practice designed to exclude residents of specific geographical areas from 
access to a service or good. The practice applies to areas characterized objectively or 
subjectively as having a bad reputation, a high proportion of foreigners, a high level of 
poverty, or even an overrepresentation of a particular religious denomination or ethnic group. 
Redlining was studied for the first time in the mortgage granting field, both theoretically 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and empirically (Ladd, 1998). It has since been studied in many 
other spheres, such as the location of supermarkets or stores (Eisenhauer, 2001; Kwate et al. 
2013; Zhang and Ghosh, 2016), or even computerized data processing (Ruggieri et al., 2010).  
On the labor market, redlining involves selecting job applicants based on their place of 
residence. There are two types of theoretical justifications for this behaviour. First of all, 
employers may prefer applicants who live close to their workplace, when worker productivity 
depends on the distance from home to work. Zenou and Boccard (2000) were the first to 
propose a formal redlining model in the labor market based on a pure distance effect in an 
efficiency wage framework. This foundation of the endogenous nature of the distance effect 
has been reinforced by two exogenous risks related to the fact that a distant employee may be 
more frequently absent or late (van Ommeren et al., 2011) and that the turnover rate of distant 
employees may be higher since longer commutes reduce the utility associated with a job for a 
given salary (Sattinger, 1998).   
A second justification for redlining from the standpoint of employers is that place of residence 
can play the role of signal as regards the productive and unproductive characteristics of the 
applicant during a recruitment drive, where the employer is in an asymmetric information 
situation regarding applicants’ individual abilities (Phelps, 1972; Fang and Moro, 2011; Rich, 
2014). In the absence of perfect information on the productivity of job applicants, employers 
assign them what they think are the typical characteristics of predominant population groups 
in disadvantaged neighborhoods, which is to say people of foreign origin with fragile incomes 
and unstable employment situations. According to these representations, place of residence is 
perceived as a signal of lesser professional reliability or an undiversified social network. 
Redlining is then similar to a form of statistical discrimination, independent of distance 
between place of residence and workplace. This type of neighborhood effect has been the 
subject of many empirical confirmations (McGregor, 1977; Tunstall et al., 2014).   
It is important to distinguish between these two mechanisms because their impact on public 
policy is very different. To reduce the distance effect, we must bring people closer to jobs or 
jobs to people, through initiatives such as the “Moving to Opportunity” programs 
implemented in the United States, (the Gautreaux Project is an example of this) or else 
develop the transportation network, whereas legal recourse must be sought in order to combat 
                                                 
3 According to the Chicago Encyclopedia, the federal program Home’s Owners’ Loan Corporation, in the 1930s, 
used a colour code to identify in red (i.e. redline) residential areas with a majority African-American and/or 
impoverished population.   
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discrimination based on place of residence. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, for example, 
makes redlining illegal on the basis of race, color, religion or origin (gender was added in 
1974). In France, place of residence was introduced explicitly as one of the 
prohibited grounds for discrimination in February 2014 (Article L. 1132-1 of the Labor 
Code). 
But it is very difficult to empirically distinguish between the two mechanisms based on 
investigation data or administrative sources. The use of experimental data then provides an 
alternative methodology. The correspondence test originally used to measure ethnic or racial 
discriminatory behaviours of employers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Riach & Rich. 
2002; Heckman, 1998; List & Rasul, 2011; Oreopoulos, 2011) can be used to identify the 
significance and magnitude of a large number of non-discriminatory behaviors of employers 
(or other economic agents). It can help identify the effect that the distance of a place of 
residence brings to bear from an employer’s perspective. In the experiment, we use only 
fictional applications and our outcomes are the call-back rates. Then, the unobservable 
characteristics of labor suppliers do not affect the results observed, and it is possible to 
manipulate the location of applicants in an ad hoc manner.  
The basis of our study is a field experiment conducted between October 2011 and February 
2012 in the Paris region, which consisted in filing nearly 3,000 fictitious applications in 
response to real job offers in the food services sector, for positions as servers and cooks. In an 
earlier article drawing upon this experiment, we showed that the effect of a neighborhood’s 
reputation substantially impacts the probability of being invited for an interview (Bunel et al. 
2016). In this previous paper, we measured the effect of the neighborhood’s reputation by 
simply controlling the distance between home and work. The idea here is to go much further 
by simultaneously measuring both a distance effect and a neighborhood’s reputation effect, in 
order to be able to quantify the joint contribution of these two mechanisms. This article is 
based on a secondary use of a database derived from a testing, such as Neumark (2012) did 
when he took over datas from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) to propose a new measure of 
discrimination. 
Our aim is to specify the extent and significance of the distance effect in order to test, using 
experimental data, the redlining hypothesis. Our results show that the distance effect 
negatively and significantly influences the probability of getting a job and reinforces the 
effect of an area’s reputation. In European cities of a rather monocentric nature, where 
available jobs are concentrated in city centres, the residents of poor suburbs are both 
penalized by their distance from the place of employment and due to the reputation of their 
place of residence.  
The article is organized as follows. The first section is a literature review on the respective 
roles of location and distance on access to employment. We present the experiment’s design 
in the second section, results in section 3, and robustness tests in section 4. 
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2. Location and distance effect in employment access 
In the Paris region, as is the case in most other large metropolitan cities, significant 
differences in unemployment risk are observed among individuals living in relatively close 
geographic areas. Adjoining municipalities frequently fall into opposing deciles when it 
comes to the distribution of unemployment rates or durations. According to a study conducted 
by Gobillon et al. (2011) based on administrative data sources from this region, only 30% of 
the differences between local unemployment durations are explained by characteristics 
specific to the individual, while 70% come from characteristics linked to location. In this 
context, it would seem worthwhile to identify the specific role played by employer 
expectations as concerns the actual location of their employees’ residences or their distance 
from their place of employment.   
In the extensive literature concerning spatial inequalities for access to employment, a number 
of mechanisms are taken into consideration. According to the spatial mismatch hypothesis, 
physical distance between place of residence and available jobs complicates the job searching 
process and lowers the chances of finding work (Kain, 1968; Ellwood, 1986; Gobillon et al., 
2007). A number of empirical studies have tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The work of 
Rogers (1997), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998), Johnson (2006), and Hellerstein et al., (2014), 
for example, concerning the United States, can be cited in this regard. In France, Détang-
Dessandre and Gaigné, (2009), Duguet et al. (2009), and Korsu et al., (2010) confirm the 
hypothesis. The theoretical foundations for the link between these two elements are manifold. 
From an individual point of view, according to Phelps's island parable, searching for a job is 
more costly given limited access to information for jobs that are far away than for nearby 
jobs. This phenomenon is reinforced by the presence of intermediaries on the job market (in 
France, Pôle Emploi (national employment centre) and the Missions locales (local missions)), 
which provide a free data-collection service for available jobs and job search assistance, but 
only within a limited geographic area (Cavaco et al., 2004). Furthermore, accepting a job that 
is far away is costly in terms of time and money for workers, whether or not they decide to 
move (Van Ommeren and Fosgerau, 2009, Van Ommeren and Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau, 2011; 
Boman, 2012). A number of studies have highlighted the fact that this cost varies widely 
depending on whether or not an individual owns a car  (Gauthier and Zenou, 2010 and 
Raphael et al., 2001) and also as a function of the differences between the quality of 
transportation services within the same area (Houston, 2005 for a synthesis of these studies). 
Furthermore, in Europe, many individuals prefer to remain sedentary (Seater, 1979; COE, 
2009). For Gobillon et al. (2011), distance from work is the main factor explaining 
differences in unemployment risk for populations of African descent in the United States and 
France.  
Another extensively explored possibility to explain spatial differences involves the socio-
demographic make-up of a given area. Neighborhood effects, peer effects and social networks 
influence the quality of the job search experience and help explain disparities in access to 
employment (Ioannides and Datcher-Loury, 2004; Galster, 2010; Hellerstein et al., 2014). An 
individual’s place of residence is linked to the housing market and to differences in housing 
from one area to another (Kain, 1968, Patacchini and Zenou, 2005). Furthermore, the 
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existence of local amenities and especially of local public policies determining allocations of 
public and assisted jobs influences, in part, an area’s dynamism when it comes to employment 
and unemployment.    
In this article, we are interested in the factors that affect labor demand (not labor supply) and 
that help explain why employers might prefer residents of certain areas compared to others. 
We focus exclusively on two factors: the effect of the reputation of place of residence and the 
effect of physical distance between place of residence and work location. On the one hand, 
poor households and ethnic minorities concentrated in certain geographic areas may be 
victims of discrimination on the part of employers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; 
Hellerstein et al. 2008; Duguet et al., 2010), discrimination which varies depending on the 
degree of homophily that exists between an applicant and an employer (Jacquemet and 
Yannelis, 2012). On the other hand, according to the effect of distance from the work 
location, workers who travel long distances every day are at risk of making relatively less 
effort in their work place. Furthermore, workers who are at the mercy of traffic are more often 
late for work or absent, and they are generally less flexible when it comes to their work 
schedules (Van Ommeren et al., 2011). In certain countries (Japan and France) employers pay 
part of their workers’ transportation costs, a phenomenon which also reinforces the process 
described. Finally, employers may take the fact that long travelling times reduce employees’ 
productivity into consideration when they hire workers. Given that workers who live far away 
are at risk of higher resignation rates, companies hire them less often in order to reduce 
employee turnover costs (Sattinger, 1998). 
As shown by Manski (1993), distinguishing between the various effects likely to have an 
impact on the relationship between individuals’ place of residence and their probability of 
being employed is an exceedingly complex process when based solely on survey data or 
administrative records. Correlation, endogeneity and context effects seriously disrupt such 
identification. The correspondence test method makes it possible to avoid this problem of 
identification and to test the significance and extent of two particular effects: reputation and 
distance.    
 
 
3. Experimental design 
Correspondence test consists in putting together entirely fictitious applications, identical in all 
but the applicants’ place of residence, and sending them out in response to real job offers 
(Bertrand et al., 2016; List et al., 2011; Riach et al., 2002). Our outcome is only the called-
back of applicants and our field of investigation covers the food services sector in the Ile-de-
France region. As demonstrated by Neumark et al. (1996), this sector brings to light the part 
of discrimination that is due to the clientele by comparing the situation of servers with that of 
cooks in the same facilities. Another advantage of focusing on the latter is that they are 
geographically dispersed, thus offering a high variability of distance between the location of 
the facility and that of our fictitious applicants’ homes. The detection risk for our experiment 
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is low owing to the turnover rate, which is twice as high as that of other occupations (around 
110) and to the fact that 50% of employers in the sector claim to have difficulty recruiting. 
 
Applicants were young men with last names that indicated traditional French surnames. For 
both tested occupations, we provided two different diplomas, a trade certificate (CAP) and a 
high school diploma (BAC). We sent out 2,988 fictitious applications in response to 498 job 
offers located in Ile-de-France between October, 2011 and February, 2012. Bunel et al. (2016) 
describe in greater detail the experimental design for this testing campaign (resume and cover 
letter presentation, type of training and so on). In this paper, we mainly examine the 
characteristics of fictitious applicants’ residence location, and above all, follow-up regarding 
job offers to which we responded.  
 
3.1. Location of fictitious applicants’ place of residence 
Six similar resumes of young applicants for server and cook jobs were put together.4 
The only differences, clearly apparent in the applications, concern their places of residence. 
The latter were chosen in a way that would allow us to identify three distinct effects on access 
to employment, all other factors being equal, i.e. the reputation effect of the département* of 
residence, the neighborhood effect and the distance effect. We chose two close but contrasting 
departments: Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis. In these departments, we selected three addresses 
in areas or neighborhoods that are geographically close but have very different reputations. 
Proximity in fact makes it possible to measure the neighborhood reputation effect for a given 
distance from the workplace. A group of three fictitious applicants resides in the 19th 
arrondissement** of Paris, in neighborhoods close to each other but whose signal effect is 
very different. We chose Place du Tertre, a wealthy and touristic Montmartre neighborhood; 
Championnet street, in a middling neighborhood; and the very disadvantaged area of La 
Goutte d’or, which is a so-called priority neighborhood for the city. The discrepancies among 
these sectors are backed by the socio-economic statistics shown in Table 1.   
Another group of three fictitious candidates resides in the Seine-Saint-Denis department, 
which has a rather bad reputation in Ile-de-France. The unemployment rate there is higher, 
and more residents lack formal education and live in “sensitive urban zones” (ZUS). The 
median income and the number of taxable households are also lower. However these typical 
characteristics hide wide disparities. Certain communities are particularly disadvantaged, 
while others display very positive socio-economic indicators. 
                                                 
4 It is difficult to find out the number of resumes sent in response to each offer. According to APEC, for 2011, the 
average number of resumes per job offer was 41.  
*A French administrative division, hereafter referred to as department. 
** The closest English equivalent is borough. 
 
7 
 
We intentionally chose three very different locations in terms of reputation. The first applicant 
lives in the prosperous Raincy suburb, which does not comprise a single sensitive urban zone 
(ZUS) neighborhood and whose economic indicators are better than those of Paris in general, 
and better than those of the 18th arrondissement specifically. The two other applicants reside 
in the suburban Bondy commune (municipality), one in a disadvantaged neighborhood, 
classified as a sensitive zone (Pavillon building, Blériot avenue), the other in a neutral 
neighborhood (Allée des Violettes). In the Bondy commune, a third of the population lives in 
sensitive urban zones (ZUS), where the median income and the portion of taxable households 
is below the Paris and the French department average, and where the unemployment rate is 
higher.  
 
3.2. Characteristics and location of offers 
To make up our sample, job applications5 were sent for all server or cook job offers, requiring 
a CAP trade certificate or a high school vocational diploma, offering either fixed-
term contracts or permanent work contracts, located in Ile-de-France. In order to take into 
account the influence of observable variables that may explain the hiring strategies of 
employers, we collected the available information on job offer postings (type of facility, 
location, salary, etc.) and those associated with testing (mailing date, gender of contact 
person, etc.). What makes this testing campaign unique is its having very specifically taken 
the location of the offers into account.  
According to the stock data recorded by the French statistical services, 60% of Ile-de-France 
jobs in the food services and hotel sector are located in Paris and only 13% in Seine-Saint-
Denis. Table 2 shows the concentration indicator in the food services and hotel sector, 
revealing that the number of jobs per 100 workers in this sector is three to four times greater 
in Paris than in Seine-Saint-Denis. As a result, half the population of Seine-Saint-Denis works 
in another department than their own, compared to a third for Parisians. The listed job offers 
for which fictitious applications were sent confirm this concentration of offers. More than 
55% are located in Paris (56%), compared to 5% in Seine-Saint-Denis. The concentration is 
higher for servers than for cooks (63% of offers for servers are located in Paris, compared to 
49% for cooks).   
Table 2 also shows the distance in kilometers and travel time by car and public transit. These 
distances were calculated a posteriori with the addresses of the job offers. Note that in 25% of 
cases, the full address was not listed in the posting. In this case, we used the centre of the 
                                                 
5
 The websites of Pôle d’Emploi and L’Hôtellerie-Restauration that centralize most job offers in the food 
services sector were used between mid-October 2011 and the beginning of February 2012 to identify potential 
offers. In total, 498 job offers from different facilities were tested: 253 cook job offers and 245 server job offers. 
This corresponds to 2,988 applications (6x498) filed.  
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municipality for which the offer applied. However, no location information was available 
concerning 2% of postings.  
The distances to these job offers in kilometers or in time are very different for the group of 
applicants located in Seine-Saint-Denis and the group located in the 18th arrondissement of 
Paris (Table 2). The fictitious applicants of the first group are located three times further from 
the jobs than the second. The median distance is 18 km compared to 6 km. To travel these 
distances, they must put up with a commute that is two to three times longer. Finally, note that 
the job offers located outside of Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis are generally closer to the 
applicants located in Paris (15 km compared to 24 km).   
 
4. Location effect and distance effect 
In this section our fictitious applicants’ response rates are presented. The response is 
considered to be positive when the recruiter invites the applicant for an interview or when the 
recruiter contacts the latter to obtain more information about the applicant’s current situation 
or his or her qualifications. On the other hand, the answer is considered to be negative if the 
recruiter explicitly rejects the application or does not answer at all. 
In 192 cases involving the 498 job offers tested, the employer contacted at least one applicant 
out of the six fictitious applications, i.e. a response rate of 39%. This positive response rate is 
somewhat higher for cooks (42%) than for servers (35%), reflecting a lesser degree of labor 
market tension as regards the latter. According to Table 3, in 28% of cases involving positive 
applications, the employer contacted only one applicant, and in 16% of cases, all our fictional 
applicants were contacted. 
 
4.1. Effect of distance on employment 
The success rates presented in Table 4 illustrate the extent of the distance effect on 
employment, when we put aside the reputation of an applicant’s place of residence. The 
results obtained clearly show that distance from a worker’s place of employment, whether 
expressed in terms of kilometers or of transportation time in a personal vehicle,6 greatly 
reduces the probability of obtaining employment for cooks and for servers.    
Employers tend to prefer hiring workers whose places of residence are located close to their 
businesses. Given that applicants from Seine-Saint-Denis are structurally farther away from 
locations where job offers are proposed (about 15 minutes by car and 25 minutes by public 
transit, according to Table 2), part of the difference in the response rate observed may be 
related to this distance effect. However, the latter effect does not help explain the differences 
observed between applicants from disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged neighborhoods 
                                                 
6
 We prefer this time measurement given that in the resumes it is mentioned that the applicants have a driver’s license and a 
personal vehicle.    
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within the same department.7 The following point clarifies the interrelationships that may 
exist between these two phenomena.   
 
 
4.2. Crossed effects of location and distance  
We examine the crossed effects of distance and location by looking at the difference between 
two applicants’ commuting time based on three categories. For commuting time by car, we 
have established a less-than-5 minute journey, which is a difference in favor of Seine-Saint-
Denis applicants (difference 1); a difference to the disadvantage of Seine-Saint-Denis 
applicants, where the journey is between 5 and 15 minutes long; and a difference of over 15 
minutes, representing respectively 19%, 29% and 52%.8 When differences in distance are 
expressed in kilometers, the considered boundaries are 5km and 10km, representing 
respectively 16%, 19% and 64%. Table 5 takes into account all three effects: the effect of 
distance, the effect of neighborhood reputation, and the effect of department reputation. 
The distance effect appears to benefit the residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods and ill-
reputed departments (difference 3 column) but the effect is not symmetrical (difference 1 
column). Seine-Saint-Denis and “sensitive urban zone” ZUS residents are no more likely to 
get a job than other potential applicants, despite a greater proximity to the workplace. 
Servers holding a trade certificate (CAP) who apply for employment are called in for an 
interview even more rarely.9 When differences in distance are small (difference 2 column), we 
consistently observe that applicants from disadvantaged neighborhoods are penalized.  
 
4.3. Control of offer and distance characteristics   
This last section presents the results of a Probit regression with a random effect on the 
likelihood of being invited for an interview, applied to our full sample. 
Table 6 presents results obtained for various specifications. Dummy variables on location 
(DEP93, ZUS, DEP93*ZUS); level of education (high school equivalent); and occupation 
(cook) were introduced in all regressions. They are significant and have the expected signs in 
all cases. Control variables for offers were also included (type of respondent, type of contact 
                                                 
7
 Given that these applicants even live slightly closer to the jobs than their counterparts from non-disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods in the same department, the distance effect should work in their favor.   
8Various boundaries have been tested with no change in results.  
9When using public transit commuting time, results are largely the same but they are not as pertinent because applicants had 
mentioned in their resumes that they owned a personal vehicle. Furthermore, the cases where information on commuting time 
was available and where commuting time differences are limited, are few (7%).  
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person, source of the offer, type of posting). Models 1 to 5 are characterized by control of the 
distance variable. 
Model 1 does not include this dimension in the regression. Consequently, the department 
effect is reinforced: it exceeds the diploma effect and is twice as important as the 
neighborhood effect. 
Models 2 to 5 use either a continuous variable (models 2 and 4) or a discrete variable (models 
3 and 5) to control the distance effect. Models 2 and 3 refer to commuting time using a 
personal vehicle, whereas the two following models focus on the distance in kilometers. 
According to Akaike’s criterion, the latter is the most pertinent specification (model 4). 
As a general rule, when the commuting-time factor is introduced, the department effect 
decreases dramatically. The coefficient associated with it is halved. The ZUS effect on the 
other hand increases slightly, and the coefficients associated with diploma and occupation 
remain stable. 
It should be noted that when we crossed the ZUS and Dep93 variables with distance, the 
coefficient turned out to be non-significant; hence employers’ consideration of the impact of 
distance does not depend on the applicants’ locality of origin. 
The marginal effects have been calculated for models 2 and 4. Probability is -2.09 (-2.53) for 
a medium distance to work (journey by car) for applicants living in Seine-Saint-Denis. The 
marginal effect is -1.94 (-2.27) for applicants residing in La Goutte d'or. By way of 
comparison, the marginal effect for a high school diploma is +2.11 (+2.17). The two effects 
are therefore of the same order of magnitude. 
Figure 1 presents the probabilities obtained using the estimates provided in Table 6. The green 
and blue areas refer to distance away from workplace for 75% of Paris and Seine-Saint-Denis 
applicants. The overall probability of success drops sharply depending on distance from place 
of residence to location of workplace. Applicants are three times less likely to get an 
interview if they reside more than 40km away from the place of employment. 
Regarding distance from workplace, the probability of access to employment is equal for 
residents of Seine-Saint-Denis and of disadvantaged neighborhoods in Paris. However, 75% 
of Paris residents fall in the green area. Consequently, Seine-Saint-Denis applicants (blue 
area), are less likely to obtain employment. They are doubly disadvantaged. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this study, we put forward experimental evidence confirming the hypothesis of employer 
redlining. Two types of mechanisms impact applicants’ chances of obtaining employment 
depending on their place of residence. The first is the reputation of the neighborhood where 
they reside; the second, the distance between their home and the workplace, is also a powerful 
factor. Therefore, among the characteristics that are decisive in terms of applicants’ chances 
of getting back into employment and that are specific to the individual, place of residence 
plays an active role in as much as employers select applicants for recruitment depending on 
their address. 
These conclusions are drawn from a controlled experiment carried out between 2011 and 
2012 in the Paris region, focusing on the server and cook occupations. They are not 
necessarily valid for other locations, time periods or occupations. New tests regarding 
discrimination are required in order to verify their level of generality. However, these 
conclusions are in line with previous testing conducted in the Île-de-France region, which 
highlighted the location-of-residence effect and indicated that the latter is a combined signal 
effect and distance-from-workplace effect. Our findings also suggest that in European cities, 
which are spatially organized in a rather monocentric manner and where employment is 
concentrated at the centre of conurbations, the distance effect reinforces the neighborhood-
reputation effect. In Seine-Saint-Denis, undoubtedly like many other disadvantaged outskirts 
of metropolitan areas, residents suffer two-fold discrimination based on the distance of their 
home from the workplace and the reputation of their place of residence. 
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Table 1: Socio-economic indicators characterizing the different neighborhoods selected for the experiment 
 
Paris Seine-Saint-Denis 
 
All 
18th 
arrondissement 
Disadvantaged 
neighborhoods 
of the 18th 
arrondissement All 
Disadvantaged 
neighborhoods 
of Bondy Bondy Le Raincy 
Unemployment rate (2009) 11% 13.1% 20.1% 16.5% 23.1% 17.7% 9.3% 
2006 activity rate of 25-65 year olds 76.6% 83.7% 70.60% 80.3% 65.20% 80.1% 83.5% 
Population 
       Foreigners (1999) 14.5% 19.1% 32.7% 18.7% 18.3% 18.6% 5.8%
% without diploma (1999) 13.3% 18.1% 28.6% 24.4% 28.1% 24.2% 9.5% 
Interdecile ratio 11.5 11.2 n/a 8.5 n/a 8.9 6.3 
2009 median tax revenue (in € per CU) 25,040 18,400 13,700 15,080 13,200 14,110 26,630 
Mobility 
       % of employees working in another department of 
the region 30.7% 30.4% n/a 55.5% n/a 51.4% 48.8% 
% of employees working in another region 1.7% 1.4% n/a 0.8% n/a 0.6% 1.0% 
% of individuals who own a car (2009) 39.9% 29.9% n/a 63.8% n/a 67.6% 77.3% 
Job concentration and recruitment difficulties  
      Indicator of job concentration (2009) 164 93 n/a 87 n/a 64 71 
Indicator of concentration in the food services and 
hotel sector 
cooks 
servers 
141 
132 n/a n/a 
43 
31 n/a n/a n/a 
Recruitment difficulty:  
cooks 
servers 
45% 
38% n/a n/a 
59% 
25% n/a n/a n/a 
15 
 
The job concentration indicator is equal to the total number of jobs or to the number for a given occupation in the area for every 100 employed 
workers or to the number for a given occupation for the area. 
Source: Pole Emploi, Insee 
 
16 
 
 
Table 2: Distance and travel time between location of offer and applicants’ place of residence 
 
Applicant located in .... 
 
the 18th arrondissement of 
Paris 
Bondy or Le Raincy in Seine-
Saint-Denis 
 
Q1 Median Q3 Q1 Median Q3 
Location of offers (weight of these offers) 
  
   
Average distance in km 
   
   
Paris (56%) 4.1 5.1 6.5 14.0 17.0 21.0 
Seine-Saint-Denis (5%) 7.5 11.0 15.0 8.5 15.0 28.0 
Other (39%) 5.5 15.0 29.0 16.0 24.0 37.0 
Total 4.6 6.6 15.0 15.0 18.0 25.0 
Average time in minutes by car 
  
   
Paris (56%) 9 11 14 24 29 32 
Seine-Saint-Denis (5%) 14 20 27 17 24 39 
Other (39%) 14 26 39 26 34 46 
Total 10 14 25 24 30 37 
Average time in minutes by public transit     
Paris (56%) 24 27 32 44 54 61 
Seine-Saint-Denis (5%) 33 43 54 42 56 72 
Other  (39%) 31 51 71 56 72 91 
Total 26 32 50 48 58 72 
Interpretation: 56% of offers are located in Paris. The median distance to these offers is 5.1 km for applicants located in the 18th 
arrondissement and 17 km for those located in Seine-Saint-Denis. 
Source: Testing data 
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Table 3 
Characteristics of applications based on response rate 
Number of positive responses 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of applications 1,836 318 162 204 102 180 186 
Frequency of offers 61% 11% 5% 7% 3% 6% 6% 
Frequency of positive offers 
 
28% 14% 18% 9% 16% 16% 
Number of positive responses 0 53 54 102 68 150 186 
Source: Testing data 
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Table 4 
Gross Success Rate 
 Favorable 
response rate 
Confidence interval of 90% 
Favorable 
response 
rate 
Confidence interval of 
90% 
 
Lower limit Upper limit Lower limit 
Upper 
limit 
 
Cooks Servers 
Distance in km (1) 
      Less than 10km 32.2% 28.7% 35.7% 23.6% 20.6% 26.6% 
From 10 to 20 km 25.1% 21.8% 28.4% 14.1% 11.5% 16.8% 
From 20 to 30 km 19.2% 15.2% 23.1% 16.0% 12.3% 19.6% 
From 30 to 45 km 13.7% 8.8% 18.6% 12.7% 7.1% 18.4% 
45 km or more 11.7% 6.7% 16.7% 5.7% 1.6% 9.7% 
Kruskal Wallis Test 37.52***   27.80***   
Travel time by car (1) 
      Less than 15 minutes 31% 27% 34% 24% 21% 27% 
15 to less than 30 minutes 27% 24% 30% 15% 12% 18% 
30 to less than 60 minutes 20% 17% 24% 14% 11% 17% 
60 minutes or more 11% 7% 15% 11% 6% 15% 
Kruskal Wallis Test 33.32***   22.44***   
(1) It was impossible to determine the location of 11 job offers.  
Confidence intervals were calculated using the bootstrap method carried out on 10,000 draws. 
*** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, n.s: not significant  
Source: Testing data 
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Table 5 
Comparison of two responses according to discrepancy in commuting time between an 
applicant from a disadvantaged neighborhood of a department with a negative reputation and 
an applicant from a privileged neighborhood of a department with a positive reputation 
 
Variation 1 Variation 2 Variation 3 Total 
 
In % 
points 
T 
Student 
In % 
points 
T 
Student In % points 
T 
Student 
In % 
points 
T 
Student 
Time by car      
  
   
Cooks 
 
  
  
   
CAP trade 
certificate level -5.8 -1.0 -7.3 -1.4 -7.3 -1.2 
-6.6* -1.95 
 High school level  3.2 0.5 -13.9* -1.7 -14.4** -2.0 -7.8* -1.85 
Servers 
 
  
  
   
CAP level -8.0** -2.1 -14.1*** -3.0 -8.1 -1.4 -10.3*** -3.78 
High school level -0.1 -0.0 -15.0 -1.2 -18.8*** -2.7 -14.7*** -2.62 
Distance in km 
 
  
  
   
Cooks 
 
  
  
   
CAP level 3.8 0.5 -9.4** -1.9 -9.3** -2.0 -6.6* -1.95 
High school level 4.9 0.6 -13.1 -1.5 -12.0** -2.1 -7.8* -1.85 
Servers 
 
  
  
   
CAP level Ns  -12.9** -2.4 -11.6*** -3.0 -10.3*** -3.78 
High school level -12.4 0.6 9.9 1.1 -17.4*** -2.7 -14.7*** -2.62 
 (1) It was impossible to determine the location of 11 job offers.  
Variation 1: Situation where the time difference is either favorable for residents of Seine-Saint-Denis or less than 5 minutes 
compared to Parisian applicants 
Student statistics were calculated using the bootstrap method carried out on 10,000 draws. 
*** significant at the 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% threshold 
Source: Testing data 
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Figure 1 
Estimated probabilities of success according to geographical location and distance to 
employment 
 
« Estimated probabilities of success according to geographical location and 
distance to employment » 
« Location effect » 
« Estimated probability in % » 
« Travel time » 
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Table 6 
Estimated probability of a positive response with a random effect on offers 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables Coef 
T 
Student Coef 
T 
Student Coef 
T 
Student Coef 
T 
Student Coef 
T 
Student 
Location of the offer           
Located in a 
sensitive   urban zone (ZUS
) -0.630*** -3.02 -0.699*** -3.32 -0.700*** -3.35 -0.654*** -3.11 
-
0.647*** -3.07 
Located in Seine St Denis 
(Dep 93) -1.374*** -7.52 -0.807*** -3.65 -0.867*** -4.13 -0.713*** -3.19 
-
0.653*** -2.64 
ZUS *Dep 93 0.729** 2.39 0.670** 2.19 0.747** 2.45 0.633** 2.06 0.691** 2.24 
Distance and commuting time         
Information not available on 
the distance or time from 
home to work         
  
Distance from home to work  
in km       -0.065*** -4.81 
  
Distance <10         2.417*** 4.52 
Distance 10 to 30 km         1.407*** 3.03 
Distance greater than 30 km         Ref.  
Driving time from home to 
work in minutes   -0.044*** -4.25 
      
Time<15 minutes     2.747*** 4.60     
Time 15 to 50 minutes     1.770*** 3.24     
Time longer than 50 
minutes     Ref.  
    
           
Characteristics of the individual         
Vocational high school level 1.099** 2.52 1.069** 2.47 1.118** 2.59 1.036** 2.37 1.041** 2.38 
Offer for a cook (ref. server) 0.937** 2.34 0.985** 2.47 0.967** 2.43 1.020** 2.53 1.028** 2.55 
Characteristics of offer and business         
Offer from Pôle Emploi 0.754 1.58 0.926** 1.95 1.041** 2.17 1.028** 2.13 0.940** 1.95 
Contact person is a woman -0.145 -0.29 -0.177 -0.35 -0.206 -0.41 -0.183 -0.36 -0.183 -0.36 
Type of business (ref: 
brasseries (French pub-
restaurant))         
  
Asian specialties -0.697 -0.59 -0.788 -0.68 -0.856 -0.73 -0.823 -0.71 -0.759 -0.65 
Creperie (French pancake 
house)) -0.091 -0.15 0.007 0.01 -0.129 -0.21 0.057 0.09 0.091 0.14 
Gastronomic restaurant 0.072 0.04 0.211 0.12 0.081 0.05 0.224 0.13 0.250 0.14 
Pizzeria or Italian restaurant 1.187 1.46 1.122 1.39 1.031 1.27 1.197 1.47 1.170 1.43 
Traditional restaurant 1.569 1.32 1.699 1.44 1.374 1.18 1.695 1.42 1.731 1.45 
Hotel restaurant 0.533 0.85 0.604 0.96 0.495 0.79 0.678 1.07 0.649 1.02 
Other 1.203* 1.65 1.471** 2.01 1.409** 1.93 1.671** 2.25 1.533** 2.08 
Unknown 1.246 1.48 1.276 1.53 1.241 1.51 1.334 1.58 1.370 1.62 
Consistency -3.975*** -5.94 -3.197*** -4.68 -6.2065 -7.04 -3.369 -4.97 
-
6.060*** -7.15 
sigma 3.299***  3.271***  3.300***  3.302***  3.307***  
Handing out resumes YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
rho           
Number of observations 2,922  2,922  2,922  2,922  2,922  
Number of groups 487  487  487  487  487  
Log-likelihood -981.2  -971.9  -986.2  -968.2  -968.4  
Pseudo-R2 4.94%  5.95%  4.36%  6.35%    
Akaike information criterion 2,002.5  1,985.7  2,017.3  1,978.4  1,980.8  
Schwarz information 
criterion 2,122.1  2,111.3  2,149.3  2,103.99 
 2,112.4  
Standard deviations were calculated normally. 
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*** significant at the 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% threshold 
Note: In this regression we also introduce binary variables corresponding to various resume distributions. These variables appear to be 
non-significant.  
Source: Testing data 
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